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6. Finally, there are the characteristics of the baby boom itself. A
recent study [16] has shown that a major factor in the boom has been
the significant decline since 1940 in age at marriage. From 1890 to
1940, age at marriage drifted irregularly downward, the decline in the
median for all females amounting to only one-half year. In the next
decade, a period one-fifth as long, the reduction was twice as great
[55, Series A-229]. In addition, wives have had children much sooner
after marriage. These two factors, earlier marriage and earlier child-
bearing, rather than mothers having substantially more children, ac-
counted for most of the rise in the fertility rate through 1954 [16, pp.
365-7 1]Thecentral role of young families in the baby boom is ob-
vious. It would be difficult indeed to account for this unless their in-
come and employment experience had been exceptionally good.
III. Conclusions and Possible Implications
The most striking feature of the baby boom—and thus the one call-
ing most urgently for explanation—is the apparent abrupt break with
historical experience. However, reconciliation of present and past be-
comes easier when one recognizes that even before the 'forties the his-
torical record was characterized by fluctuations of significant magni-
tude and duration, and that the record for the total white population
is a composite of the varying experience of several component groups,
subject in part to quite different influences. Major swings in agricul-
tural conditions, on the one hand, and Kuznets cycles in nonagricul-
tural activity with accompanying immigration fluctuations, on the
other—each with their peculiar historical timing—gave rise to dis-
tinctive fertility responses on the part of the rural white, foreign-born
white, and urban native white populations. When one unravels these
differing strands of experience and considers their underlying influ-
ences, the impression emerges that the recent fertility behavior of the
urban native white population, the group of central significance for
explanation of the baby boom, is not as inconsistent with its earlier
character as was heretofore believed. In the first three decades of the
Thedraft law policy of deferring fathers doubtless encouraged earlier marriage and
childbearing, but without an income situation that favored expansion of the family beyond
the first child, it is doubtful that it could have produced a baby boom of the type experi-
enced.
There is now reliable evidence that the average number of children per mother has also
risen in the postwar period. This development is of course consistent with the analysis
presented here. The longer the exceptional labor market situation prevails, the more likely
the fertility response will take this form in addition to earlier marriage and earlier child-
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century, the fertility of this group, instead of exhibiting a declining
trend, showed reasonable stability. And in the recent period the effect
on the labor market of a Kuznets-cycle expansion—an expansion
stronger, according to our data, than any preceding ones considered
here—was for the first time not accompanied by an offsetting rise in
the rate of labor-market entry due to a significant increase in either
immigration or the native-born population in young working ages. The
unprecedented concurrence of these three circumstances—a Kuznets-
cycLe expansion in the economy, restricted immigration, and a low rate
of labor-force entry from the native population resulting from demo-
graphic processes—created an exceptional job market for those in fam-
ily-building ages and as a result drastically accelerated the founding
of This process was further abetted by a concurrent boom
in agricultural conditions, which evoked a similar fertility response on
the part of the rural white population.
In conclusion, some of the implications of the preceding analysis for
the past and future may be set forth, as long as it is recognized that
these remarks are largely speculative and offered primarily in the hope
of stimulating further inquiry.
With regard to the past, it was noted earlier in the discussion that
while Kuznets cycles in the rate of population growth are not a new
"With regard to the causes of the exceptional labor market for young persons in the
'forties and 'fifties, W. Lee Hansen has brought to the writefs attention that the present
paper emphasizes quantitative scarcity to the exclusion of relative quality. The following
figures on median school years completed by young and middle-aged males at various dates








12.5 (1) 25—29 8.4 8.7 10.1 12.0
(2) 45—54 8.1 8.2 8.4 8.7 10.0 12.0
(3) (1)—(2) 0.3 0.5 1.7 3.3 2.3 0.5
Note the immense gain in the educational advantage of young over middle-aged workers
in the 'forties, a change which sharply improved their competitive position at just the
time that labor demand was booming. The timing is fortuitous, stemming from the abrupt
advance in the diffusion of high-school education that occurred in the 'twenties and especially
the 'thirties. (The figures are from [50, pp. 236, 2381 and [52, pp. 6-71. The 1920 and
1930 values were assumed the same as those reported by the corresponding cohorts in
1940, the first time that data on educational attainment were collected.)
The sequence of change in the educational differentials calls to mind the recent pro-
nounced convergence in income distribution by size. One wonders to what extent the
change in the size distribution in the past forty years may reflect changing income differ-
entials by age associated with variations in both the relative number and quality of young
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phenomenon in our history, the shift in the source of these movements
from immigration to fertility raises a question whether the recent cycle
bears any logical connection to its predecessors. The implication of the
present analysis is that indeed such a connection does exist. As long
as we permitted free immigration, the rise and fall of immigration in
response to swings in labor demand associated with Kuznets cycles in
this country acted as a buffer to moderate the impact on the urban na-
tive white population. With the restriction of immigration, however,
the urban native white population felt the impact of a Kuznets-cycle
swing in labor demand with unprecedented force, and the result was
an unparalleled response in fertility and thus again in the rate of popu-
lation growth.
As for prediction of the shorter-term future, say, the decade of the
'sixties, the principal lesson of the analysis is the need for a detailed
comparative study of the recent and prospective labor-market ex-
perience of those in family-building ages. The indirect indicators used
here for inferring the labor-market conditions encountered by the
young urban white population, so far as they are relevant, suggest one
striking contrast with the recent past. The change in the rate of entry
into the labor market (as gauged by predictions for the total male
population aged 20-29), which has held remarkably steady in recent
decades, will rise abruptly in a way unfavorable to continuation of the
present rate of change of fertility, reflecting of course the upturn in the
birth rate some twenty years ago. Indeed the prospective rise is un-
precedented in the seven decades of experience covered here. Assuming
no significant alteration in the rate of change of the unemployment rate
—in other words, continuation of a reasonably high-level employment
situation—a relative weakening in the exceptional labor market condi-
tion enjoyed by young persons in the recent past is implied, and a con-
sequent adverse response in the fertility rate (though not necessarily in
the number of
The historical analogue which suggests itself is the movement from
1915-19 to 1925-29, when with little change in the percentage unem-
ployed a rise in the rate of labor market entry from around —2to +8
per cent was accompanied by a fertility decline of 6 per cent (App.
Table A-8). In the prospective situation, the rise in the rate of entry
will be from around —2 to ±20 per cent. However, a potentially sig-
nificant offsetting compositional change will be the abrupt rise in the
proportion of women of reproductive age in the more fertile ages,
20-29. After a fairly steady downward drift over the past half-century,
As the preceding footnote shows, the educational advantage of young over older
workers will also change sharply in the 1960's in a direction unfavorable to continuation of
the exceptional situation of the young.32 AMERICAN BABY BOOM
this proportion (as projected for all classes of the population) will rise
from a low or around 38 per cent in 1960 to about 50 per cent by 1975
[53, No. 187 (Nov. 10, 1958)]. To a significant extent, this change
is of course the female counterpart of the rise in the rate of labor-
market entry for males.
It is quite possible that our indicators may be inadequate for in-
ferring the prospective labor-market experience of young persons; or
conceivably there may be new compensating factors, such as a shift
in coniposition of labor demand especially favorable to the young or
a general acceleration in the rate of growth of the economy. Since 1957
there has been a slight decline in the fertility level, but it is as yet un-
certain whether this may only be temporary [68, pp. 2-3]. In any event
a detailed study of the labor market for young persons, past and pros-
pective, is clearly needed.
The implications of the present analysis for the longer-term future
of fertility change are in contrast with that likely to be suggested by
the typical demographic discussion of our fertility history. Assuming a
possible reduction in fertility in the 'sixties, the customary emphasis
of demographers on the long-term secular decline in the past would
suggest a view of this as a resumption of the primary The in-
terpretation suggested by the present analysis, however, would be that
for the group whose experience is of central significance for the future,
the urban native white population, the nature of the primary trend
in this century—whether upward or downward—is not readily appar-
ent, and conceivably the recent behavior of this group may be ex-
plained at least in part in terms of the Kuznets-cycle conception of
time-series change. If this is correct, and assuming continuation into
the longer-term future of a reasonably high-level-employment economy,
one might imagine a more or less self-generating mechanism, by which
in one period a decline in the rate of labor-market entry causes a con-
current rise in the rate of change of fertility, and this in turn leads,
with a rise in the rate of labor-market
entry and a consequent decline in the rate of change of fertility. But
this is just one hypothetical possibility. The fundamental point is that
substantial fertility variation, up or down, may occur over the longer
run.
Clearly the present analysis suggests that a re-examination of the primary trend itself
in terms of the differing patterns of the groups distinguished here might prove fruitful.